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INTRODUCTION 
Patent reform has become, perhaps improbably, one of the most 
contentious issues facing Congress and the courts over the past six 
years.  The fights range across a number of major issues, which not 
only separate patent owners from patent defendants and those who 
believe in innovation incentives from those who believe in market 
competition, but also divide patent owners themselves along both in-
dustry and technology lines.  Advocates on both sides paint seemingly 
irreconcilable pictures of the patent system, either as a stable system 
with clearly defined legal rights essential to innovation or as a system 
rampant with litigation abuse by “patent trolls” who use the legal sys-
tem to divert money from innovative companies.1 
 Far too much of this debate is based on anecdote and assumption, 
not real data.  Pharmaceutical patent owners assume that most of the 
world works the way their industry does; so, too, do information tech-
nology (IT) companies.  Patent trolls are variously portrayed as re-
sponsible for the majority of all patent lawsuits, for no more than two 
percent, or as mythical creatures that do not actually exist.2 
 
1 On these two views of the world, see DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PA-
TENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 3-6 (2009). 
2 See, e.g., Patent Trolls:   Fact or Fiction:   Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14-18 (2006) 
(statement of Dean Kamen, President, Deka Research & Development Corporation) 
[hereinafter Kamen Testimony], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/ 
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:28201.pdf (questioning whether 
patent trolls even exist); Jennifer Kahaulelio Gregory, The Troll Next Door, 6 J. MAR-
SHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 292, 305-09 (2007) (arguing that the term “patent troll” 
obscures real problems in the patent system); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent 
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The opening of the Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse in De-
cember 20083 allows us to collect data that give a unique perspective 
on many of these debates.  Using this data, we identify the patents liti-
gated most frequently between 2000 and 2007 and compare those pa-
tents to a control set of patents that have been litigated only once in 
that period.  The results are startling.  The most-litigated patents are 
far more likely to be software and telecommunications patents, not 
mechanical or other types of patents.  They are significantly different 
from once-litigated patents in ways that signal their value up front.  
And they are disproportionately owned by nonpracticing entities (i.e., 
“trolls”).  The results do not answer all of the policy questions; we of-
fer only one important piece of a larger mosaic.  But our findings have 
significant implications for debates over patent reform, since we show 
both that the most-litigated patents are the most valuable ones4 and 
 
Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009 (2007) (asserting that nonprac-
ticing entities account for thirty to forty percent of suits in the computer and electron-
ics industries); Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures:  A Com-
ment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 166 (2007) 
(“In reality only two percent of all patent litigation is linked to so-called trolling.” (foot-
note omitted)).  
3 Press Release, Stanford Law Sch., Stanford Law School Launches Intellectual Proper-
ty Litigation Clearinghouse (Dec. 8, 2008), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/ 
program/centers/iplc/#press_releases.  The website of the Stanford IP Litigation 
Clearinghouse (IPLC) is located at http://lexmachina.stanford.edu.  
4 When we speak of value, we refer to private value, or value to the owner.  We also 
refer only to the fact of value and not to any quantitative measure of value.  We defend 
the litigation-value connection extensively in our prior work.  See John R. Allison et al., 
Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 440-43 (2004) (explaining the intuitive litigation-
value connection and its strong empirical support); see also John R. Allison & Thomas 
W. Sager, Commentary, Valuable Patents Redux:  On the Enduring Merit of Using Patent 
Characteristics to Identify Valuable Patents, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1794 (2007) (defending 
the value-litigation connection).  The economics literature supports this connection as 
well.  See, e.g., Dietmar Harhoff et al., Citations, Family Size, Opposition and the Value of 
Patent Rights, 32 RES. POL’Y 1343, 1345 (2003) (finding that “patents which are upheld 
against opposition . . . are particularly valuable”); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schanker-
man, Characteristics of Patent Litigation:  A Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 
140 (2001) [hereinafter Lanjouw & Schankerman, Characteristics] (finding that litiga-
tion correlates with patent value and that “the number of claims is another 
. . . indicator of the ‘bits of information’ contained in a patent, and therefore its val-
ue”); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., Post-Issue Patent “Quality Control”:   A Comparative Study of 
U.S. Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions 6-22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 8807, 2002) (comparing USPTO and EPO opposition 
mechanisms and finding that the most valuable patents were challenged in both sys-
tems); Dietmar Harhoff & Markus Reitzig, Determinants of Opposition Against EPO Patent 
Grants—The Case of Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals 4 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 3645, 2002) (confirming that “patents with above-average values 
are more likely to be attacked”); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Enforcing In-
tellectual Property Rights 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8656, 
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that they are most commonly in the hands of companies other than 
the ones building new products. 
In Part I we describe our study.  In Part II we report our results.  
Part III discusses the implications of our findings. 
I.  STUDY DESIGN 
Only about 1.5% of all patents are ever litigated in court.5  The 
majority of patents are worth no more than a few thousand dollars;6 
litigated patents are almost by definition extreme outliers, since the 
parties are willing to spend millions of dollars per side in legal fees in 
order to litigate them.7  In prior work, two of the authors demonstrat-
ed that litigated patents have significantly different characteristics 
than other patents.8  They include more claims, cite more prior art, 
 
2001) (“[M]ore valuable patents . . . are much more likely to be involved in suits.”); cf. 
Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights:   A Survey of 
the Empirical Literature, 49/50 ANNALES D’ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 223 (1998) 
(surveying the literature on the issue).  This Article both strengthens that conclusion 
and demonstrates for the first time a strong relationship between the number of times 
a patent is enforced and the determinants of value.  It also allows us to refute a hypo-
thesis that we addressed but could not resolve in our prior work:  that litigated patents 
are valuable, but not the most valuable patents.  Litigation, on this account, is evidence 
of weakness in a patent.  Perhaps competitors quietly take licenses to the truly valuable 
patents, and the ones they fight about are akin to an “upper-middle class” of potential-
ly valuable but less-than-perfect patents. 
5 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1507 (2001). 
6 See, e.g., Jonathan A. Barney, A Study of Patent Mortality Rates:   Using Statistical Sur-
vival Analysis to Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 317, 329 (2002) (“A relatively 
large number of patents appear to be worth little or nothing while a relatively small 
number appear to be worth a great deal.”); Jean O. Lanjouw et al., How to Count Patents 
and Value Intellectual Property:   The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. IN-
DUS. ECON. 405, 412 & n.3 (1998) (noting a variety of studies finding “that most pa-
tents are of very little value”); Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1521, 1526 (2005) (documenting the failure of most patentees to pay maintenance 
fees costing only a few thousand dollars); Thomas Ewing, Book Review, 43 SANTA CLA-
RA L. REV. 631, 633 (2003) (“Some of the authors simply recount patent procurement 
and litigation statistics ad nauseum and do not seem to understand that some patents 
really do have no value whatsoever since no one would ever practice the disclosed 
technology, as claimed.”).  Maintenance fees are due in increasing amounts at 3.5 
years, 7.5 years, and 11.5 years after the patent issues.  35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2006).  The 
fees are $830 at 3.5 years, $1,900 at 7.5 years, and $2,910 at 11.5 years.  Id.  Those fees 
are halved for small entities.  Id. § 41(h)(1).  
7 See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY, at I-91 
(2007) (reporting that the median cost of high-stakes patent lawsuits is five million dol-
lars per side in legal fees through trial). 
8 Allison et al., supra note 4; see also Allison & Sager, supra note 4, at 1794 (defend-
ing the statistical power of the results in the earlier study). 
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are cited more often by later patents, file more continuation applica-
tions, and come from larger “families” of patents.9  They are also con-
centrated in certain industries.  For example, semiconductor patents 
are particularly unlikely to be litigated because the industry is concen-
trated and cross-licenses are common.10  Many of these characteristics 
are within the control of the patent applicant, and most are known by 
the time the patent issues.  Allison et al. suggest that these characteris-
tics are evidence of the private value of patents.11 
That prior work depended significantly on a randomly selected 
sample of cases actually litigated.  The development of the Stanford IP 
Litigation Clearinghouse in December 2008 opened up a second al-
ternative.  The Clearinghouse collects every patent-infringement law-
suit filed since January 1, 2000, in searchable format, and links those 
suits to the patents in suit.12  Using that database, we identified every 
patent that has been litigated eight or more times between 2000 and 
2007 (including cases still pending).  We identified 106 such patents.13  
For purposes of our study, we also identified a randomly selected con-
trol set of 106 patents that have been litigated only once during this 
time period.  This allows us to extend the work that Allison et al. did in 
2004, comparing the “ordinary” litigated patents (already outliers, as we 
have seen) to the most-litigated patents.  If Allison et al. are correct, we 
would expect those most-litigated patents to exhibit even more evi-
dence of private value, and perhaps even more of an industry skew. 
 To test these hypotheses, we collected a variety of data about both 
the patents and the patent lawsuits.14  For each litigated patent, we col-
 
9 Allison et al., supra note 4, at 438. 
10 Id. at 468-69. 
11 Id. at 460. 
12 Due to increased availability of electronic filings in federal court, the ability to 
identify patents in suit has improved markedly, particularly since 2003.  Moreover, elec-
tronic access varies by district, potentially making this patent data set underinclusive for 
certain districts despite manual collection of cases from those districts.  Nevertheless, the 
patents identified represent the best, most representative data set available. 
13 For purposes of this analysis, we include declaratory-judgment actions as well as 
actions filed by the patent owner.  Until 2007, the rules for declaratory judgment re-
quired a clear threat of suit by the patent owner.  See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (requiring reasonable apprehension of im-
minent suit), abrogated by MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) 
(permitting a declaratory judgment action so long as there is an actual controversy be-
tween the parties).  We count only separate lawsuits; many patent lawsuits are filed 
against multiple defendants in a single proceeding. 
14 We do not address the outcomes of those lawsuits in this Article; that is the sub-
ject of a companion piece by the authors, tentatively entitled Patent Quality and Risk 
Aversion Among Repeat Patent Litigants.   
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lected information about small-entity status (i.e., whether the patent 
owner at issue is an individual, university, or small business, as opposed 
to a large business); whether the patent is assigned before litigation; the 
number of continuation applications filed leading to issuance of the pa-
tent; the raw and adjusted number of “forward citations” (citations to 
the patent by later patents); the number of “prior art references” the 
patent makes to U.S. patents, foreign patents, and nonpatent prior art; 
and the number of claims in each patent. 
We also categorized each patent into both an industry and a technol-
ogy in order to ascertain whether significant differences existed in the 
technology and industry areas.15  We did not use the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) classification system because our prior work has 
found that it is badly flawed.16  Instead, we did our own categorization.  In 
our description of technology and industry areas for inventions that we 
actually encountered in our data sets, we attempted to define the areas in 
a comprehensive way, and our definitions are thus broad enough to in-
clude specific inventions not actually found in our data sets.17 
A.  Technology Areas 
(1) Software:  An invention in which data processing is a suffi-
ciently critical element that at least one claim element in the patent 
consists of data processing—the actual manipulation of data—
 
15 We did not attempt to create a comprehensive typology of such areas, but for ob-
vious reasons only identified and defined those technology and industry areas we actually 
encountered in the population of the 106 most-asserted patents and the sample of 106 
once-litigated patents.  Although the size of our data sets is sufficient for sound statistical 
analysis, the relatively small numbers of observations necessarily results in our having en-
countered fewer technology and industry areas than we would have encountered in a 
much larger patent data set.  The technology categories are not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive because modern inventions so often involve multiple technologies. 
 Our industry categories are also not all mutually exclusive, reflecting the reality of 
modern industry crossovers.  For example, a software-implemented telecommunica-
tions process or product rightly belongs in both a computer and a communications 
industry category.  There are, however, fewer inventions belonging in more than one 
industry category than there are inventions belonging in more than one technology area 
because mixes of technologies in inventions are more common than industry crossovers. 
16 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What?  An Empirical Explora-
tion of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2114 (2000). 
17 Although we report descriptive statistics and bivariate comparisons for all of our 
technology and industry areas, we defined a few technology and industry areas en-
countered in the data set that we ultimately did not subject to statistical testing because 
the number of observations for such areas was so small as to render statistical analysis 
meaningless.  We did this to create definitions of categories that could also be used in 
data sets other than the ones we used in this study.   
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regardless of whether the code carrying out that data processing is on 
a magnetic storage medium or embedded in a chip.  The latter is of-
ten called “firmware.”18  This category includes the two software patent 
subsets described below. 
(2) Pure software:  An invention consisting only of data 
processing; all claim elements in the patent consist of data processing.  
However, we include in this definition a patent on data processing in 
which there is a trivial nondata processing element such as a generic 
input, output, or storage element clearly not intended to represent 
any novel technical advance.  This category is a subset of software. 
(3) Software business method:  Also a subset of software patent, 
this category includes software patents that cover methods for con-
ducting business transactions.  Business-method patents are notorious-
ly difficult to define, with possible definitions varying greatly in scope.  
For this study, we used a narrow definition limited to those patents the 
claims of which obviously covered only such things as automated gener-
ation of customer proposals, advertising, and the use of online catalogs. 
(4) Mechanical:  A process, machine, or product that consists sole-
ly of the use of mechanical parts, sometimes combined with heat, hy-
draulics, pneumatics, or other power sources; or an invention in 
which the above is a critical part.  Some inventions classified as me-
chanical will also be in one or more other classifications, such as elec-
tronics.  While many different types of inventions fit into this category, 
it is not a catchall “other” category. 
(5) Electronics:  A process, machine, or product in which the in-
vention or a critical part thereof makes use of traditional electronic 
circuitry or involves electric-energy storage.  An invention in this clas-
sification may also be included in other classifications, such as chemi-
stry, mechanics, or optics. 
(6) Optics (other than imaging):  A process, machine, or product 
in which the invention or a critical part thereof employs light waves.  
Optics technology will sometimes also be classified in one or more 
other areas, such as electronics or chemistry. 
(7) Imaging:  A process, machine, or product in which the inven-
tion or a critical part thereof involves the creation or processing of 
images for various purposes.  The imaging may be analog or digital.  
 
18 The difficulty in defining a software patent, and the detailed reasoning that 
supports our definition, can be found in Arti K. Rai, John R. Allison & Bhaven N. Sam-
pat, University Software Ownership and Litigation:  A First Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 101, 
111-15 (2009). 
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The majority of imaging patents have medical uses, but some serve 
other purposes such as security or meteorology. 
(8) Biotechnology:  A process involving advanced genetic tech-
niques intended to construct new microbial, plant, or animal strains; a 
product created from such a process; or the way such a process or 
product is used in biotechnology research.  Although there are a 
number of different genetic-engineering techniques, for several rea-
sons we decided not to disaggregate these techniques into separate 
technology areas. 
(9) Chemistry:  A process consisting of chemical reactions, a 
product resulting from such a process, an invention of which a chemi-
cal process or product is a critical part, or an invention consisting of a 
purportedly novel use of chemical substances.  Closely related inven-
tions such as those on novel metal alloys and nonmetallic amalgams are 
also included.  An invention in the field of chemistry may be included 
in one or more other classifications, such as electronics or optics. 
B.  Industry Areas 
 (1) Computer:  This industry encompasses both software and 
computer-hardware inventions, including not only hardware products 
but also machines and processes for making computer hardware.  As 
discussed below, some but not all inventions in the semiconductor in-
dustry are also included in the computer industry category. 
 (2) Semiconductor:  The semiconductor industry category in-
cludes inventions of any kind intended to advance the state of the art 
in researching, designing, or fabricating semiconductor chips.  De-
spite the fact that many semiconductor devices are intended to be 
computer components, not all are so intended, and we thus do not 
automatically include semiconductor patents in the computer indus-
try category.  There are situations in which a patent appropriately be-
longs in both the computer and semiconductor industry categories, 
such as a patent on a software or computer-hardware invention specif-
ically for use in semiconductor device fabrication, but this is not an 
automatic industry crossover. 
 (3) Electronics:  This is a somewhat narrower version of the elec-
tronics technology category.  This industry category includes many pa-
tents that involve the use of electronics technology, but inventions of 
which electronics technology forms a part are not always legitimately 
viewed as being within the electronics industry.  An example might be 
an electro-mechanical process (covered by both the mechanical and 
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electronics technology areas) for creating a packaging system for inte-
grated circuits and printed circuit boards.19  Although reasonable 
minds could differ, it seems most logical to include such an invention 
in the computer and semiconductor industries for which the packag-
ing is intended, not in the electrical industry. 
 (4) Medical:  This industry category includes inventions of any 
kind used for research on, or for the diagnosis or treatment of, diseas-
es or other abnormal conditions in humans or animals.  Patents on 
processes and products for pharmaceutical purposes are not included 
in the medical industry category. 
 (5) Pharmaceutical:  The pharmaceutical industry category in-
cludes patents on drugs for treating diseases or other abnormal condi-
tions in humans or animals, as well as processes for producing or us-
ing such drugs. 
 (6) Biotechnology:  In this instance, we concluded that the bio-
technology technology area, which we define broadly, should also be an 
industry category. 
 (7) Chemical:  The chemical industry category includes inventions 
of all kinds that deal primarily with the making, transportation, and 
use of chemical substances, except for pharmaceutical drugs.  It is both 
narrower and broader than the chemistry technology area.  It is narrow-
er in the sense that it does not include patents on inventions using 
chemical techniques to produce nonchemical products that more log-
ically belong in another industry.  For example, a patent including an 
element covering the use of chemical techniques in semiconductor 
fabrication would not be included in the chemical industry category.  
The industry category is broader than the chemistry technology catego-
ry, as it includes inventions not employing chemistry techniques but 
that nevertheless are intended for use by chemical companies, such as 
a mechanical invention relating to the handling of chemicals. 
(8) Communications:  The communications industry category in-
cludes patents on inventions of all kinds intended to advance the state 
of the art in communications. 
(9) Transportation:  This category includes patents on any type of 
invention related to vehicles of any type, or to the provision of trans-
portation services. 
(10) Energy and utility services:  This category includes patents on 
inventions of any kind associated with power generation, transporta-
 
19 U.S. Patent No. 5,551,216 (filed July 20, 1995) (issued Sept. 3, 1996). 
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tion, or consumption.  Also included are inventions related to the de-
livery of public utility services. 
(11) Financial:  This category includes processes and products as-
sociated with providing financial services of various kinds.  Such pa-
tents usually employ software and, if so, are also included in the com-
puter industry category. 
(12) Consumer goods and services:  This category includes patents 
on products and services of all kinds intended for personal consumer 
purposes.  Also included are patents on methods for marketing, buy-
ing, or delivering personal consumer goods or services, which often 
will be software implemented and thus will also fall within the computer 
industry category. 
(13) Construction:  The construction industry category includes 
inventions of all kinds related to the erection or maintenance of struc-
tures, or to excavation. 
C.  Entity Status 
 Finally, we investigated the nature of the patent plaintiff.  Follow-
ing Lemley and Myhrvold,20 we categorized each patent owner into 
one of the twelve different “entity status” categories listed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1:  Entity-Status Classes 
 
Entity Class 
 
Description 
1 Acquired patents 
2 University heritage or tie 
3 Failed startup 
4 Corporate heritage 
5         Individual-inventor-started company 
6 University/Government/NGO 
7 Startup, pre-product 
8 Product company 
9 Individual 
10 Undetermined 
11 Industry consortium 
12 IP subsidiary of product company 
 
20 Mark Lemley and Nathan Myhrvold are currently working on an article, tenta-
tively entitled The Complex Ecology of Patent Plaintiffs, employing this method.  
LEMLY FINAL REVISED READY TO PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2009  12:20 PM 
2009] Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? 11 
 Of the twelve entity classes, only one (Class 8) involves enforce-
ment by a patent owner that actually makes products.  The remainder 
are different types of “nonpracticing entities,”21 sometimes called “pa-
tent trolls” for the prototypical practice of hiding under a bridge they 
did not build and demanding a toll from surprised passersby.  Rather 
than take a position on what, if any, nonpracticing entities should be 
considered “trolls,” we classify each patent owner and let the reader 
decide.  We do, however, report the results for practicing versus non-
practicing entities (i.e., Class 8 versus other classes) as well as the re-
sults for each class. 
D.  Statistical Analysis 
We tested each of the results reported here for statistical signific-
ance.  We report the results in the tables in most cases.  But, unless oth-
erwise noted, the reader should assume that we report only results with a 
confidence level greater than 99% (i.e., a p-value of less than 0.01).22 
In addition to descriptive statistics and bivariate comparisons of 
individual variables between the two data sets,23 we also checked our 
results using logistic regression to determine which differences be-
tween the two data sets remained significant after accounting for inte-
ractions (correlations) among the variables within each set.  Logistic 
regression is one form of multiple regression, which is used when 
there are multiple predictor (or explanatory) variables and only one 
dependent variable (here, either a singly or multiply litigated patent). 
We conducted two logistic regressions, one including the key pa-
tent characteristics and technology areas, the other including those 
same patent characteristics and industry areas. 
The patent characteristics included in each regression, some of 
which are obviously categorical variables and some of which are ob-
viously continuous variables, were as follows:  (1) whether ownership 
of the patent had been assigned after issuance and before the first liti-
gation of that patent; (2) whether the patent was initially issued to a 
 
21 After a diligent search, we could not identify the entity status of a few patent 
owners.  We have classified those entities as 10 (Undetermined) and have excluded 
them from our entity-status analyses.   
22 In social science research, a confidence level of 95% (p-value of 0.05) is typically 
treated as sufficient to show statistical significance.  Thus, a confidence level of 99%  
(p-value of 0.01) shows a far greater degree of confidence that the differences are not 
due to random chance.  
23 We used accepted statistical techniques to adjust many of the variables to nor-
malize skewed distributions before making bivariate statistical comparisons. 
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small or large entity; (3) the number of U.S. nonprovisional applica-
tions leading to the particular patent; (4) the number of forward cita-
tions, adjusted for patent age; (5) the subset of forward citations con-
sisting of self-citations, also adjusted for patent age; (6) the number of 
claims; (7) the number of references to prior U.S. patents; (8) the 
number of references to prior foreign patents; and (9) the number of 
references to nonpatent prior art (i.e., “other publications”). 
 In the regression with technology areas, we included all of those 
listed in the descriptive and bivariate statistics, except that we used the 
total number of software patents and did not break the software cate-
gory into subsets.  In the regression with industry areas, we included 
all of those listed in the descriptive and bivariate statistics. 
II.  RESULTS 
A.  The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents 
 We begin by investigating the characteristics of the most-litigated 
patents and comparing them to the control set of patents that were 
litigated only once.  The results are dramatic.  The most-litigated pa-
tents differ fundamentally in virtually every respect from even the 
once-litigated patents.  We report these results in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2 shows that the most-litigated patents made extraordinary 
use of patent continuations.24  Litigated patents in the control set had 
an average of two priority applications—the original application and 
one continuation or divisional.  Moreover, fully half of the patents in 
the control set filed no continuation applications at all.25  By contrast, 
the most-litigated patents had an average of 4.3 applications each, and 
the median patent in this set had 3 applications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 For a discussion of patent continuations, see Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. 
Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004). 
25 This explains the otherwise odd result that the median number of applications 
filed is 1.5---exactly half of the patents had one application, and half had more than one. 
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Table 2:  Continuation Applications and Forward Citations 
 
 
Number 
of Non- 
provisional 
U.S. Apps. in 
Chain 
 
Total 
Number of 
Forward 
Citations
Adjusted 
Total 
Number of 
Forward 
Citations
 
Total 
Number 
of Self-
Citations
 
Adjusted 
Number 
of Self-
Citations 
Most-Litigated  
Patents
Mean 4.32 32.25 -0.33 1.27 2.24 
Median 3.00 15.50 -0.17 0.00 0.00 
Standard  
Deviation 4.85 42.42 1.02 5.29 11.20 
      
Once-Litigated 
Patents
Mean 2.01 14.07 -0.77 1.33 1.00 
Median 1.50 6.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 
Standard  
Deviation 1.40 23.18 1.74 2.74 1.71 
      
Bivariate Comparison   
(one sample t-test with log transformation) 
p-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0173 0.0001 
Significant? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
 Table 2 also shows differences in forward citations (i.e., citations re-
ceived by subsequent patents referring back to the patent in question as 
prior art), which economists have often identified as a measure of pa-
tent value.26  The results here are more complicated.  As Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg have shown, just counting forward citations can be mislead-
ing because the older a patent is the more time others will have had to 
cite it.27  The results also need to be adjusted because citation patterns 
have changed over time.  The base results in Table 2 show that the 
 
26 A number of studies have used forward citations as evidence of patent value.  
See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Market Value and Patent 
Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 16, 29-30 (2005) (finding that an extra citation per patent 
increases a firm’s market value by three percent); Dietmar Harhoff et al., Citation Fre-
quency and the Value of Patented Inventions, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 511, 515 (1999) (con-
cluding from surveys in the United States and Germany that patents renewed to full 
term are more frequently cited than those that lapse and that citation frequency in-
creases with economic value for full-term patents); Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your 
Quotes:  Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON. 172, 172 (1990) 
(demonstrating the use of patent counts weighted by citations as evidence of patent val-
ue); cf. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Characteristics, supra note 4, at 130 (finding that cita-
tions received predicted litigation when those citations were made by competitors). 
27 Hall, Jaffee & Trajtenberg, supra note 26, at 30-31. 
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most-litigated patents are cited more than twice as often as the control-
set patents.  After adjusting the number of forward citations received by 
patents to account for their different ages, the differences between the 
two data sets are significant to an exceptional degree.28  Table 2 also 
shows significant differences in “self-citations,” a subset of forward cita-
tions that has been found to be an independent value indicator apart 
from the set of overall forward citations of which they are a part.29 
 The differences are even more dramatic when it comes to prior 
art references (sometimes referred to as “backward citations”).  These 
 
28 The method of adjustment to account for the different ages of patents involves 
placing each patent in the data set into a cohort of other patents in the data set that 
were issued during the same year.  Thus, each cohort is one year, although cohorts of 
more than one year could be used if necessary even though that would decrease preci-
sion somewhat.  The number of forward citations received by each patent is divided by 
the average number of forward citations received by other patents in the same cohort.  
This gives us the adjusted number of forward citations for that patent in the data set.  
The process is repeated for every other patent in the same cohort and then repeated 
for each patent in the other year cohorts.  To obtain the adjusted number of forward ci-
tations for an entire data set, we then averaged the quantity of adjusted number of forward 
citations received by all patents in the set.  The method is from Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. 
Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent-Citations Data File:   Lessons, Insights, and Metho-
dological Tools, in PATENTS, CITATIONS, & INNOVATIONS:   A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY 403, 434-37 (Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg eds., 2002). 
 Because of the unusual skew in forward citations, the means for untransformed for-
ward citations look nearly identical even though the differences in the distributions are 
both dramatic and highly significant.  As a result, we also report in Table 2 the log-
transformed value for adjusted forward citations, which makes the differences quite clear.   
29 Self-citations are references to the patent as prior art in subsequent patents is-
sued to the same inventor or assignee.  Self-citations have been identified as an inde-
pendent indicator of private patent value apart from overall forward citations of which 
the self-citations are a part.  See, e.g., Hall et al., supra note 26, at 31-33 (finding self-
citation to be a highly significant indicator of market value).  The apparent reason is 
that self-citations provide evidence that the patent owner is building a portfolio of pa-
tents on related technologies, and a portfolio of patents often has a value that is great-
er than the sum of its parts.  See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent 
Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2005).  Because there can be multiple inventors on 
a patent, and because ownership of a patent can sometimes change after issuance, 
there is occasionally difficulty in identifying a particular forward citation as a self-
citation.  Thus, we used the following decision rule for identifying self-citations:   a 
forward citation is a self-citation if either (a) the owners of the main patent and the 
forward citation are the same, or (b) the owners are different, the inventors in the main 
patent and the forward citation are the same, and there are no co-inventors (i.e., no 
other inventors).  To apply this decision rule, we had to examine the front pages of 
each of the 3419 patents that constituted forward citations to patents in our two data 
sets.  Economists do not examine individual forward citations and thus use a blunter 
test to identify self-citations---a forward citation is a self-citation when the assignee 
(owner) of the patent is the same in the instant patent and the forward citation.  See, 
e.g., Hall et al., supra note 28, at 424.  This approach clearly does not capture any 
nuance, but it has the advantage of being automatizable. 
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are references to prior U.S. and foreign patents as well as printed pub-
lications and claims.  Table 3 presents these results.  The most-
litigated patents have more than 50% more claims than the control 
set—39.3 on average compared with 24.5 for once-litigated patents.  
The number of claims is sometimes associated with patent value, 
though two of the authors have elsewhere noted the complexity of the 
claim count/value relationship.30  Much more significant is the differ-
ence in prior art citations.31  The most-litigated patents cite nearly 
three times as many U.S. and foreign patents as other litigated patents 
and nearly ten times as many nonpatent prior art references as other 
litigated patents.  This is particularly notable given that litigated pa-
tents themselves cite much more prior art than unlitigated patents.32  
 
30 Allison et al., supra note 4, at 449 n.58 (noting that the number of claims in a 
patent can depend on a number of factors correlated to value); see also John R. Allison 
& Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 
1052-56 (2003) (reviewing the literature on numbers of claims as an indicator of pa-
tent value); Lanjouw & Schankerman, Characteristics, supra note 4, at 140-42 (discussing 
patent claims as an underutilized indicator of patent value); Kimberly A. Moore, Xeno-
phobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1544 (2003) (noting that, while the 
number of claims has been shown to be an indicator of private value, the reason is not 
that more claims cause the patent to have greater breadth (or scope) as economists 
have asserted, as it is the generality of claim language that creates breadth); cf. John R. Al-
lison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 77, 104 (2002) [hereinafter Allison & Lemley, Growing Complexity] (“[T]he number of 
claims could also reflect resource constraints, drafting style, uncertainty about the law or the 
significance of an invention, or a host of other factors that are not necessarily driven by pa-
tent value.”). 
31 See, e.g., Allison & Tiller, supra note 30, at 1036-39 (arguing that there is a corre-
lation between the number of prior art references and patent value); Allison et al., su-
pra note 4, at 453 (finding a statistically significant relationship between prior art ref-
erences and litigation); Harhoff et al., supra note 4, at 1360 (finding a relationship 
between prior art references cited and other measures of patent value).  But see Lan-
jouw & Schankerman, Characteristics, supra note 4, at 41 (“[A] litigated patent is likely 
to cite fewer prior patents per claim than a randomly selected patent.”).  The theory 
behind the relationship of prior art references and value is that the more citations that 
are considered during prosecution by the examiner, the less likely it is that some prior 
art exists that will invalidate the patent.  The more prior art considered, in other 
words, the more likely a patent is to survive subsequent litigation.  See, e.g., John R. Alli-
son & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA 
Q.J. 185, 232-34 (1998) (showing that courts are more likely to invalidate patents on 
the basis of uncited prior art than on prior art cited to the PTO); Moore, supra note 
30, at 1538 (“Patents that include more citations or more diverse citations are more 
likely to be valid.”).  Because lawyers know this, the value relationship may reflect not 
only the strength of patents that cite a lot of prior art, but also efforts by applicants to 
“bulletproof” patents they expect to litigate by citing a great deal of art.   
32 Allison et al., supra note 4, at 453-55.  Because many of the patents in this sam-
ple were issued before January 1, 2001, when the PTO began identifying examiner-
added prior art on the face of the patent, we were unable to determine whether it was 
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All of these differences are significant at extraordinarily high confi-
dence levels. 
Table 3:  Number of Claims and References 
  
 
 
Number 
of 
Claims
 
 
Number of 
References 
to U.S. 
Patents
 
 
Number of 
References 
to Foreign 
Patents
 
Number of 
Nonpatent 
References 
(Printed 
Publications) 
Most-Litigated 
Patents
Mean 39.29 61.46 9.00 52.68 
Median 22.50 12.00 1.00 4.00 
Standard 
Deviation 44.69 109.31 18.61 110.71 
      
Once-Litigated 
Patents
Mean 24.46 23.13 3.59 5.61 
Median 19.00 12.50 0.00 0.00 
Standard  
Deviation 23.62 30.79 7.70 16.21 
     
Bivariate Comparison   
(one sample t-test with log transformation)
p-value 0.0002 0.0149 0.0052 1.33E
-10
 
Significant? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
B.  The Technologies and Industries of the Most-Litigated Patents 
We also find dramatic differences between most-litigated and 
once-litigated patents when it comes to the technologies they employ 
and the industries with which they are associated.  Prior work has 
found that significant numbers of patents issue in a wide variety of 
technology areas and industries, including mechanics, biotechnology, 
semiconductors, and computer-related inventions,33 though this diver-
sity of technologies is a relatively recent phenomenon.34  In our 2004 
 
the applicant or the examiner that provided most of this art.  However, other work has 
shown that virtually all nonpatent prior art (over ninety percent) is provided by appli-
cants, not examiners.  See Mark Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Examiner Characteristics 
and the Patent Grant Rate 10 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 369, 2009).  Thus, it is quite likely that the disparity in nonpatent prior art cita-
tions is a result of applicant submissions, not examiner diligence. 
33 See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 16, at 2113-15, 2148 tbl.1 (showing the dis-
tribution of studied patents among fourteen technology categories). 
34 See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, Growing Complexity, supra note 30, at 93 & tbl.1, 94 
(documenting the growing diversity of patented technologies). 
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study, we found that patents were disproportionately more likely to be 
litigated in some industries than in others, and that semiconductor 
patents in particular were unlikely to be litigated.35 
 We find even more significant differences in technology and in-
dustry areas between most-litigated and once-litigated patents.  We re-
port two sets of results:  one by industry area and one by technology 
area.  As noted above, the two frequently diverge—a software inven-
tion may be used in any number of industries, some traditionally con-
sidered computer-related but others entirely divorced from it, such as 
automobiles or bioinformatics.  The results, reported as proportions of 
the 106 patents in each data set involving the identified technology or 
industry area,36 are presented in Tables 4 and 5 and Figures 1 and 2.  
 
 
Figure 1:  Technology Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 Allison et al., supra note 4, at 472. 
36 A reminder—inventions can involve more than one industry or technology 
class, so the proportions exceed 100%.  We simply compared proportions between the 
most-litigated and once-litigated data sets. 
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Table 4:  Technology-Areas Data 
 
  
Most-Litigated 
Patents
 
Once-Litigated 
Patents
Bivariate Comparison 
 (one sample t-test with log 
transformation) 
   p-value Significant? 
Software Total 0.72 0.27 1.07341E
-10
 Yes 
Pure Software  0.38 0.09 1.21E
-06
 Yes 
SoftwareBusMeth 0.15 0.04 0.004809 Yes 
Mechanical  0.08 0.53 2.54E
-12
 Yes 
Electronics 0.01 0.25 2.6E
-07
 Yes 
Optics (other than imaging) 0.02 0.06 0.149394 No 
Imaging 0.11 0.02 0.005684 Yes 
Biotechnology  0.01 0.03 0.312702 No 
Chemistry  0.19 0.18 0.859304 No 
 
The most-litigated patents are overwhelmingly likely to be software 
patents.  Nearly three-fourths of the most-litigated patents are software 
patents, compared with just over one-fourth of the once-litigated pa-
tents.  Similarly, software-implemented business-method patents are 
overrepresented in the most-litigated patents group (they comprise 
15% of the most-litigated patents versus 4% of the least-litigated).  
And imaging patents are much more heavily represented in the most-
litigated category (11% versus 2%) as well.  By contrast, mechanical and 
electronics patents make up the bulk of the once-litigated-patent cases, 
but they are only of minor significance in the most-litigated-patent set.  
Mechanical inventions make up only 8% of the most-litigated patents, 
but 53% of the once-litigated patents; electronics inventions make up 
only 1% of the most-litigated patents but fully 25% of the once-litigated 
patents.  Other industries, notably biotechnology and chemistry, do not 
show significant differences between the two data sets. 
 We see similar variance when we move from the technology areas 
to the industries.  Figure 2 and Table 5 present the results by industry.  
The computer industry is once again dominant in the most-litigated-
patent set; 72% of the most-litigated patents are in the computer in-
dustry, compared with 34% of the once-litigated patents.  Telecom-
munications is similar; 34% of the most-litigated patents are in the 
communications industry, compared with 8% of the once-litigated pa-
tents.  By contrast, a variety of more traditional industries, including 
electronics, medical, chemical, energy, consumer goods and services, 
and construction are all significantly more likely to show up in the 
once-litigated-patent set than in the most-litigated set. 
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Figure 2:  Industry Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Industry-Areas Data 
 
 
 
 
Most-Litigated 
Patents
 
Once-Litigated 
Patents
Bivariate Comparison 
(one sample t-test with 
log transofrmation) 
   p-value Significant? 
Computer 0.72 0.34 3.73E
-08
 Yes 
Semiconductors 0.05 0.05 1 No 
Electronics 0.03 0.15 0.001773 Yes 
Medical 0.02 0.13 0.001808 Yes 
Pharmaceutical 0.16 0.03 0.001004 Yes 
Biotechnology 0.02 0.03 0.650849 No 
Chemical 0.00 0.03 0.003935 Yes 
Communications 0.34 0.08 2.12E
-06
 Yes 
Transportation 0.04 0.03 0.700709 No 
Energy and  
   Utility Services 0.00 0.09 0.001197 Yes 
Financial 0.02 0.00 0.155337 No 
Consumer Goods  
   and Services 0.15 0.30 0.008647 Yes 
Construction  0.00 0.05 0.023641 Yes 
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 In short, the most-litigated patents are disproportionately IT pa-
tents—software, software-implemented business methods, computer 
industry, and telecommunications.  Notably absent from this list is 
the semiconductor industry; consistent with what Allison et al. found 
in 2004, semiconductor inventions are a relatively minor percentage 
of both data sets.37  Also surprising is the pharmaceutical industry, 
which has a significant share of the most-litigated patents but per-
haps less of a share than one might expect given their power in the 
patent-reform debate. 
C.  The Owners of the Most-Litigated Patents 
 Finally, we collect a variety of information regarding the owners of 
the patents in both the most-litigated and the once-litigated sets.  To 
begin, we must separate the initial owner of the patent from the own-
er when the lawsuit is filed because one of our findings is that more 
than one-third of the litigated patents across both data sets were sold 
to another owner after issue and before the first lawsuit was filed.38 
Small entities start out owning more once-litigated than most-
litigated patents:  57 of 106 once-litigated patents were originally as-
signed to small entities, compared to 40 of the most-litigated patents.  
While one might conclude that small entities are more likely to be oc-
casional users of the patent system, two problems complicate this con-
clusion.  First, a large number of the most-litigated patents are owned 
by a single entity—Ronald S. Katz Technology Licensing LLP.39  While 
that company is most probably a “small entity,” defined as a company 
employing fewer than 500 people, the patents were not filed with 
small-entity status.  To avoid skewing the data in either direction by 
treating Katz patents either as large- or small-entity patents, we have 
excluded them from the small-entity analysis entirely.  That means 
that the small-entity numbers are a larger share of the most-litigated 
patents than the raw numbers suggest.  Small entities owned 53.8% of 
the once-litigated patents and 46.5% of the most-litigated patents.40 
 
37 Allison et al., supra note 4, at 472. 
38 We found that 44 of the 106 most-litigated patents and 31 of the 106 once-
litigated patents were sold before litigation.  The difference was not statistically signifi-
cant, however, so we rely only on the aggregate numbers.   
39 Katz had 20 of the top 106 most-litigated patents issued in his name.  In fact, his 
impact on the most-litigated patents is even greater, because at litigation he owned still 
other patents acquired after issue.   
40 Cf. Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls:  Strategic Behavior by 
Individual Inventors, Small Firms, and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation 14 (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ. 
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 That is not the end of the story, however, because the owner of 
the patent at issue is not always the owner of the patent when the suit 
is filed.  Indeed, we find that 44 of the 106 most-litigated patents and 
31 of the 106 once-litigated patents are assigned to another entity be-
fore the first lawsuit is filed.41  In Table 6 and Figure 3, we relate the 
entity size at issue to the likelihood of assignment before litigation.   
 
Figure 3:  Entity-Assignment Matrix  
Excluding Patents Originally Issued to Katz  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper Series, Research Paper Series No. LE09-005, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337166 (finding that small firms are 
frequent patent litigants). 
41 This is consistent with Judge Kimberly Moore’s finding that assignments of liti-
gated patents are quite common.  See Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 69, 92-93 (2007); see also Carlos J. Serrano, The Dynamics of the Transfer and Renewal 
of Patents 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13938, 2008) (finding 
that the likelihood that a patent will be transferred increases with indicia of value).  
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Table 6:  Entity-Assignment Matrix Data 
 
 Most-Asserted Set Once-Asserted Set 
 Large- 
Entity 
Owner 
Small- 
Entity 
Owner 
Large- 
Entity 
Owner 
Small- 
Entity 
Owner 
Assigned  
Before  
Litigation 
  
23 21 12 19 
Not Assigned 
Before  
Litigation 
43 19 37 38 
 
 
 Notably, once assignments are taken into account, it seems that 
small entities that keep rather than sell their patents tend to litigate 
less often than either large entities or purchasers of small-entity pa-
tents.  The fact that assigned patents are more likely to be the most-
litigated patents is also consistent with the idea that the most-litigated 
patents are also the most valuable, since they are more likely to have 
been sold.42 
Next, we evaluate the nature of the patent owners in both sets.  
One of the biggest policy debates in patent reform has been over the 
nature and extent of “patent trolls.”  As noted in Part I, we divide the 
patent plaintiffs in our data sets into twelve different categories.  We 
present the results of that categorization in Table 7 and Figure 4.   
 
 
 
 
42 An alternative explanation, however, is that once a company pays money to buy 
a patent, it is more likely to enforce that patent since it wants a return on its invest-
ment.  Similarly, the correlation between value and assignment may reflect the nature 
of the acquiring entities, at least for a given subset of cases.  An entity purchasing third-
party patents to assert will presumably do precisely that.  Moreover, at least some pa-
tent holders may create special-purpose entities immediately prior to, and for, litiga-
tion.  On the other hand, one must assume that an acquirer will evaluate the likely val-
ue of patents before buying them and will not knowingly purchase patents that are 
either of highly dubious validity or of such narrow scope as to be of little use. 
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Figure 4:  Entity Status  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Entity-Status Data 
 
 
Entity Classes 
Most-
Litigated 
Patents
Once-
Litigated 
Patents 
Entity Class 1 (Acquired patents)  12 3 
Entity Class 2 (University heritage or tie)  0 1 
Entity Class 3 (Failed startup)  0 3 
Entity Class 4 (Corporate heritage)  0 1 
Entity Class 5 (Individual-inventor-started company) 43 7 
Entity Class 6 (University/Government/NGO)  0 1 
Entity Class 7 (Startup, pre-product)  0 0 
Entity Class 8 (Product company) 47 85 
Entity Class 9 (Individual)  1 0 
Entity Class 10 (Undetermined)   3 4 
Entity Class 11 (Industry consortium)  0 1 
Entity Class 12 (IP subsidiary of product company) 0 0 
Total 106 106 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
P
at
en
ts
Entity Class
Most-Litigated Patents
Once-Litigated Patents
-
LEMLY FINAL REVISED READY TO PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2009  12:20 PM 
24 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1 
 The differences are dramatic.  Once the few entities whose status 
we could not determine (three of the most-litigated patents and four 
of the once-litigated patents) are excluded, traditional product com-
panies—those that are participants in the market in which they are 
enforcing the patent—represent 83.3% of the once-litigated patents 
but only 45.6% of the most-litigated patents.  If one views all nonprac-
ticing entities as patent trolls, a view with which we do not necessarily 
agree,43 trolls hold a significant share of the most important patents, 
but a much smaller share of “ordinary” once-litigated patents.44  The 
most-litigated patents, despite being small in number compared to the 
total number of patents issued, are disproportionately important to the 
patent system because of the volume of litigation they generate.  None-
theless, it is worth keeping in mind that the 2987 infringement suits 
filed on the 106 most-litigated patents still represent only about 14% of 
the patent suits filed from 2000 through 2007.45 
Nonpracticing entities in the most-litigated-patent set fall almost 
entirely into only two classes:  licensing companies in the business of 
buying up and enforcing patents (“trolls” by virtually anyone’s defini-
tion) and companies started by an inventor that do not make prod-
ucts.  Licensing companies account for 11.7% of the most-litigated-
patent suits, and inventor companies account for 41.7% of those suits.  
Only one patentee in this group—an individual litigant—falls into any 
other category.  By contrast, the ecology of once-litigated patents is 
somewhat more diverse; that data set includes suits by universities, 
university spin-outs, failed start-ups, companies that once sold prod-
ucts but no longer do, and industry consortia.  None represents a 
large percentage of the set of once-litigated patents. 
The disparity is even greater than these data suggest.  Each patent 
in the control set has been litigated only once, meaning that each pa-
tent has an equal effect on the overall distribution.  By contrast, the 
most-litigated patents include some patents litigated eight times and 
others litigated ninety-seven times.46  Weighting entity status by the 
 
43 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 612 (2008) (arguing that universities, although nonpracticing 
patent owners, are not necessarily patent trolls). 
44 The differences we report are statistically significant at a 95% or greater confi-
dence level for class 1, and at a 99% confidence level for classes 5 and 8. 
45 See Stanford IP Litigation Clearinghouse, http://lexmachina.stanford.edu (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2009) (reporting that 13,793 total patent suits were filed between 2003 and 2007 in-
clusive).  A list of the most-litigated patents and the number of suits in the database is at-
tached as the Appendix.   
46 See infra Appendix. 
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number of lawsuits gives us a somewhat different story, one depicted 
in Table 8 and Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5:  Number of Lawsuits in  
Most-Litigated Patents, by Entity Class 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8:  Most-Litigated Patents by Status 
Entity Classes
Most-
Litigated 
Patents
Number of 
Suits in 
Most-Litigated 
Patents 
Entity Class 1 (Acquired patents) 11 199 
Entity Class 2 (University heritage or tie) 0 0 
Entity Class 3 (Failed startup)  0 0 
Entity Class 4 (Corporate heritage) 0 0 
Entity Class 5 (Individual-inventor-started company) 41 2198 
Entity Class 6 (University/Government/NGO) 0 0 
Entity Class 7 (Startup, pre-product) 0 0 
Entity Class 8 (Product company) 51 544 
Entity Class 9 (Individual) 0 11 
Entity Class 10 (Undetermined)  3 35 
Entity Class 11 (Industry consortium) 0 0 
Entity Class 12 (IP subsidiary of product company) 0 0 
Total  106 2987 
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Once we take account of the number of suits, the share of suits by 
product companies falls to 18.4%—showing that more than 80% of the 
most-litigated-patent suits are filed by NPEs.47  Most are filed by inven-
tor-owned or inventor-developed companies, which account for 74.4% 
of the most-litigated-patent lawsuits.  Further, the share of suits filed by 
licensing shops actually falls to 6.7% of all suits.  Nonpracticing entities 
are a small share of once-litigated patents, but they thus represent an 
overwhelming share of the suits filed on the most-litigated patents. 
D.  The Katz Effect 
It is worth mentioning the outsized role played here by one patent 
plaintiff, Ronald Katz.  He owns a large percentage of the most-
litigated patents, including most of the top thirty patents.  Roughly 
60% (1789 of 2987) of the patent-lawsuit combinations in the most-
litigated set are Katz-related lawsuits. There is no question that Katz is 
an outlier.  We considered removing his suits from our results but de-
cided against it, as the most-litigated patents are all outliers in some 
sense and removing Katz would skew our data.  Katz is a product of 
the current patent system, and the Katzes of the world should be con-
sidered in evaluating the effects of that system. 
E.  Logistic Regression 
 In both the technology-area and industry-area regressions, we 
found three continuous variables to be significant or highly significant 
despite the existence of substantial correlations among many va-
riables:  (1) the number of U.S. nonprovisional applications leading 
to the particular patent;48 (2) the number of references to prior U.S. 
patents;49 and (3) the number of references to nonpatent prior art 
(i.e., “printed publications”).50  In the technology-area logistic regres-
sion, we found a high degree of significance for the software  
(p = 0.0024) and mechanical (p = 0.0004) areas.  In the industry-area 
logistic regression, we found exceptionally high levels of significance for 
the computer (p < 0.0001) and pharmaceutical (p < 0.0001) areas.51 
 
47 This may overstate the role played by NPEs, however, because many of those 
suits involve more than one patent in our data set.  
48 Technology-area regression p = 0.0303; industry-area regression p = 0.0359. 
49 Technology-area regression p = 0.0223; industry-area regression p = 0.0061. 
50 Technology-area regression p = 0.0282; industry-area regression p = 0.0062. 
51 The full results of the logistic regressions are available from the authors on request.   
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Given the large number of correlated variables in patent data,52 it 
is quite meaningful that we found significance in the three continuous 
variables in both regressions.  The more interactions there are among 
variables, the more difficult it is to tease out predictive power in a 
multiple regression. 
In addition to the unavoidable correlations among many patent 
characteristics, the very nature of the question we are asking places 
some limitations on the logistic regressions.  First, the nature of our 
inquiry into the most-litigated patents necessarily means that we have 
a relatively small number of observations.  Data sets of 106 observations 
each are large enough for statistical analysis, but when combined with 
the fact of unavoidable interactions among many variables, larger data 
sets would allow for stronger results.  With larger numbers of observa-
tions, we would almost certainly find significance with more variables in 
the regressions.  There is, however, no way to make them larger.  We 
are intentionally looking at “upper-outlier patents.”  Moreover, when we 
divide the patents in our data sets into technology and industry areas, 
we necessarily reduce the number of observations even further.  This 
fact makes it even more remarkable that significance in the regressions 
was found in two technology areas and two industry areas. 
In addition, the number of interactions among variables was in-
creased by the fact that, as in our previous studies, we did not treat 
technology or industry areas as necessarily being mutually exclusive.  
This reflects the reality of modern inventions:  any attempt to assign 
many patented inventions to a single technology or industry area is 
completely unrealistic and unjustifiable.  However, the fact that a single 
patent may belong in more than one technology or industry area does 
further increase the number of interactions among these variables. 
 
52 Many patent characteristics are necessarily correlated rather highly, such as the 
number of claims, various types of prior art references, number of U.S. applications 
leading to a particular patent, and number of forward citations.  This correlation has a 
common cause:  applicants for certain patents perceive in advance that the patents 
likely will have value to them, that they will be important, and even that they are more 
likely to be litigated, and this perception often leads the applicants to make such pa-
tents stronger and broader by drafting more claims, finding and citing more prior art, 
and actively crafting the patent using continuation applications.  Their actions, in turn, 
tend to create private value for the patents.  Applicants do not have the same degree of 
control over the number of forward citations as they do over other patent metrics, ex-
cept for self-citations in their own later patents (which, as previously explained, is itself 
an independent indicator of value).  However, these are patents that the owners are 
more likely to assert through litigation or licensing, and they get more attention, leading 
to more forward citations by others in later patents.  As a consequence, the number of 
forward citations is also correlated with the internal patent characteristics noted above. 
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In the end, because of the very nature of the questions we ask and 
the unavoidable interactions in our data, our results may be portrayed 
less accurately by the logistic regressions than by the descriptive statis-
tics and bivariate comparisons.  We have accordingly emphasized 
those conclusions in the Part that follows. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
In this Part, we draw a number of possible implications from the 
data.  Notably, there are different ways to understand our data, and, 
depending on one’s predisposition, the data might point to different 
policy conclusions.  We seek to identify some of the most likely impli-
cations in this Part. 
A.  Extreme Value? 
 The first thing that stands out is the powerful evidence that the 
most-litigated patents have different, clearly identifiable characteristics 
that distinguish them from once-litigated patents (and distinguish 
them even more from ordinary, nonlitigated patents).  Notably, the 
characteristics that distinguish the most-litigated patents from other 
patents are also the ones that researchers have long used to identify 
the most-valuable patents:  more claims, more prior art citations, more 
forward citations, a higher likelihood of assignment between issue and 
litigation, and larger numbers of continuation applications.  A rea-
sonable conclusion, therefore, is that the most-litigated patents are al-
so the most-valuable patents.  Allison et al. drew this conclusion for 
the general class of litigated patents (i.e., patents that had been liti-
gated at least once).53  Our data seem to strengthen that conclusion 
substantially.  While one might question whether litigation was actual-
ly an indicator of value in all cases, the fact that more litigation is 
strongly correlated with the indicia of value suggests that the intuitive 
relationship between value and litigation is indeed the right one.54 
 
53 Allison et al., supra note 4, at 439-43. 
54 This is not to suggest, however, that the objective measures of value accurately 
capture all, or even most, of the value of patents; they are necessarily imperfect indica-
tors of that value.  See David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics:   The 
Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (2007) 
(“[T]he misuse of patent metrics has both fostered dire predictions and created unrea-
listic expectations about the capacity of patent data to guide policy.”).  But the fact that 
they are not perfect predictors does not render them worthless.  See Allison & Sager, 
supra note 4, at 1794 (concluding that, despite some imperfections, patent characteris-
tics can be useful in identifying valuable patents).     
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The fact that the most-litigated patents are disproportionately 
owned by nonpracticing entities, coupled with our suggestion that the 
most-litigated patents are the most valuable ones, might lead one to 
conclude that nonpracticing entities produce the most important pa-
tents and therefore are owed more respect than the current patent 
system (and certainly patent reformers) gives them.  This reasoning 
might also support a subsidiary conclusion that continuation applica-
tions are necessary to support the most important patents.55 
We acknowledge that these are possible implications of our re-
sults.  But there are reasons to be cautious in drawing these conclu-
sions.  The value we identify in this Article is not social value but pri-
vate value.56  Our results suggest that having more claims, more prior 
art citations, and more continuation applications leads to stronger pa-
tents, and a first-order assessment might suggest that stronger patents 
are good.  But that does not mean that those patents are necessarily 
better for society or even valid.  It may simply mean that those patents 
are optimized for litigation, because they are better protected against 
the vagaries of claim construction57 and against validity challenges 
based on uncited prior art.58  And because of the well-known con-
straints under which the PTO operates, it may even be that the PTO is 
worse at assessing larger, more complex patents in the limited time 
that examiners can devote to those patents.59 
Whether the most-litigated patents represent the most important 
inventions or just the most valuable rights to exclude, the fact that the 
patents that are likely to generate the most litigation have common 
 
55 But see Lemley & Moore, supra note 24, at 71-83 (arguing that continuations are 
mostly unnecessary and do more harm than good). 
56 On the difference, see Allison et al., supra note 4, at 439-40. 
57 Burk and Lemley argue that modern claim construction can systematically dis-
advantage patentees since even one error in claim drafting or one lost claim-
construction fight may result in a finding of either invalidity or noninfringement.  Dan 
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts?  Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1763 (2009).    Drafting more claims hedges against this risk 
by giving the patentee multiple shots at an error-free claim.  Continuations also hedge 
against this risk by allowing patentees to rewrite their claims after the fact. 
58 See Allison & Lemley, supra note 31, at 231-34 (finding that it is much harder to 
invalidate patents based on art that was cited to the PTO, leading to the possibility of 
“bulletproofing” a patent application by including as much prior art as possible).  Rela-
tedly, a sea of citations may actually diminish the PTO’s ability to analyze invalidity with 
respect to the most salient prior art included therein, since examiners operate under 
severe time constraints and are not given more time to examine applications just be-
cause they include more prior art.   
59 We test this hypothesis in an upcoming companion paper that investigates the 
outcomes of the most-litigated-patent cases.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
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characteristics, identifiable before or during patent prosecution, has 
important implications for reforming the patent-prosecution process.  
One of us argued in 2001 that it would not be cost-effective for the PTO 
to achieve 100% accuracy in granting or denying every patent.60  None-
theless, it would surely be desirable to improve the accuracy of PTO de-
cisions in both directions if it could be done without substantial addi-
tional expense.61  And if we have good information on which patents 
are likely to turn out to be important, at least in the sense that their va-
lidity is going to matter, we can use that information to focus more at-
tention on those applications during the prosecution process.  Patent 
reformers have, for example, proposed post-grant opposition,62 a tiered 
review or “gold-plating” system,63 and outside peer review of patents.64  
Each of those proposals, to be workable, requires the selection of cer-
tain patents or applications on which to focus additional attention.  The 
 
60 Lemley, supra note 5, at 1508-10. 
61 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents?, 98 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1347, 1362 (2008) (noting that “weak” patents of questionable validity are 
very costly to society and urging a “targeted application of resources” to improve the 
patent review process); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and 
Defend Patents:   Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administra-
tive Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 960-64 (2004) (arguing that 
litigation does not efficiently correct PTO mistakes and urging better funding and im-
proved processes for patent review). 
62 See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination:  Toward a Viable Administrative 
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 118-21 (1997) (recom-
mending the adoption of a post-grant opposition mechanism incorporating lessons 
learned from U.S. and European experience); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Imposs-
ible Patents Before Breakfast:  Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 614 (1999) (advocating a “coherent, efficient opposition 
procedure”); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 
759, 764 (1999) (proposing “the implementation of a post-grant opposition proceed-
ing”); J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers:  Global Competition Under the 
TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 31 (1997) (“A national opposition sys-
tem seems uniformly advisable.”); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the 
Patent System:   A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 326-30 (“The gen-
eral acknowledgment of the wisdom of oppositions is striking.”) 
63 See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Va-
lidity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 61-63 (2007) (arguing in support of an additional, optional 
“gold-plated” patent-review process); Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, 
What to Do About Bad Patents, REG., Winter 2005-2006, at 10, 10-12 (advocating for a two-
tiered patent review system).  While one might view applicant bulletproofing as a form 
of “gold plating,” the latter term refers to a proposal that the PTO devote additional 
resources to examine certain applications and award a patent that has correspondingly 
higher deference. 
64 See Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”:  Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and 
Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 143-51 (2006) (supporting an open peer-
review framework for patent reviews). 
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value data may give us a means to select applications for additional re-
view.  It could also be systematized within the PTO, for example by re-
placing the “one size fits all” allocation of examiner time with a com-
plexity-weighting system that gives examiners more time and more 
credit for evaluating the most complex (and most valuable) applica-
tions.  Moreover, the ability to identify the most valuable patents in ad-
vance may allow companies to focus their attention on smaller sets of pa-
tents with which they should be concerned when they invent in the same 
or a related area.  It may also provide investors with more relevant in-
formation when deciding whether to help fund a start-up, take a security 
interest in a patent for a loan, or make some other investment decision.65 
The data also suggest substantial variation by technology area and 
industry area in how patent litigation works.  That itself should come 
as no surprise; Burk and Lemley have documented the many ways in 
which both patent law and innovation incentives are industry specific, 
and the congressional debates over patent reform have pitted differ-
ent industries against each other on issue after issue.66  But the dis-
proportionate representation of software, telecommunications, and 
business-method patents among the most-litigated patents might sug-
gest that it is appropriate to pay more attention to patents in those 
technologies and industries, both in court and at the PTO, just as the 
importance of patents with multiple claims and prior art citations sug-
gests that those patents are more important than the average patent.  
Here too we urge caution, however:  While the most-litigated patents are 
disproportionately IT patents, there are unquestionably pharmaceutical 
patents whose value exceeds that of any patent in the IT industry.  The 
regulated nature of the biomedical industries may be limiting the num-
ber of lawsuits in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. 
B.  Trolls on Top? 
 The other important difference evident from this data is the pre-
valence of nonpracticing entities in the most-litigated patents.  Patent 
reform debates have, perhaps unfortunately, focused a great deal of 
attention on “patent trolls.”  There is substantial disagreement as to 
whether trolls exist and how significant a role they play in patent liti-
 
65 See Allison & Sager, supra note 4, at 1787-88 (describing how prospective inves-
tors may sift through a set of patents looking for ones of value). 
66 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 49-66 (documenting industry differences in 
innovation and patenting); see also Josh Lerner, The Litigation of Financial Innovations 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14324, 2008) (finding that finan-
cial-services patents are litigated 27 to 39 times more than ordinary patents).  
LEMLY FINAL REVISED READY TO PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2009  12:20 PM 
32 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1 
gation.67  Our data shed significant light on this question, though 
readers may disagree on how to interpret that data. 
 Nonpracticing entities are clearly an important phenomenon in 
the modern patent system.  While they account for only about 16% of 
the once-litigated patents, they represent over 80% of the suits filed 
involving the most-litigated patents and own more than 50% of the 
most-litigated patents themselves.68  Clearly, then, the role of nonprac-
ticing entities in the modern patent system cannot be dismissed and 
should not be diminished. 
Whether this represents a flood of patent trolls depends critically 
on how one defines the term “patent troll.”  If a patent troll is anyone 
who sues to enforce a patent that she does not practice, trolls are in-
deed rampant among the most-litigated patents.  But if we limit the 
definition to companies enforcing patents that cover inventions they 
did not themselves develop, the number of patent trolls drops dramat-
ically, to 12% of the patents and 7% of the lawsuits.  And even if the 
reader decides that trolls are rampant, that fact informs policy debates 
over patent reform but does not itself tell us whether to celebrate or 
deplore the role of patent trolls. 
One of the authors has argued that we should not focus so much 
attention on labeling particular plaintiffs as trolls or not, but instead 
on making sure that the patent rules provide patentees of all types fair 
compensation but not opportunities for holdup.69  Even if we are not 
to create troll-specific rules, however, our findings here are important 
because they suggest that the remedy rules that do depend on the 
plaintiff’s status, such as entitlement to injunctive relief70 and lost-
profits damages,71 are critically important and need to be evaluated in 
 
67 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
68 Colleen Chien studied the percentage of all suits filed by trolls.  In defining only 
a subset of nonpracticing entities as trolls and excluding lawsuits by individuals, she 
found that while 17% of suits were filed by trolls, those suits accounted for 28% of the 
defendants in patent cases—a share that has continued to rise over time.  Colleen V. 
Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings:   Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of 
High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1608-11 (2009). 
69 See Lemley, supra note 43, at 630-31 (arguing that identifying trolls is not as im-
portant as preventing abuses of the patent system by any plaintiff). 
70 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006) (requiring 
proof of irreparable injury before granting injunctions in patent cases).  
71 See, e.g., BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1219, 
1223 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversing an award of lost profits because the patentee and the 
infringer did not compete); cf. Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 
F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (describing the “general rule” that patentees produc-
ing the patented item are entitled to lost-profits damages); John E. Dubiansky, An 
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the context of a world in which many of the most significant patent 
lawsuits are not those filed by practicing entities against competitors.  
APPENDIX:  THE MOST-LITIGATED PATENTS72 
 
Analysis for the Valuation of Venture Capital-Funded Startup Firm Patents, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 170, 177 (2006) (“In the licensing context, however, the patent owner is not 
engaged in an enterprise which utilizes the patent.  Consequentially, the owner has no 
profits to have lost, and is only eligible to receive a reasonable royalty.”). 
  72 The count here is based on the number of lawsuits in which the patent could be 
verified using IPLC data.  Because some lawsuits, including some of Katz’s lawsuits, in-
volve more than one patent, the actual number of cases filed by the plaintiffs identified 
here is smaller than simply adding the number of suits for each patent would suggest.  
Patent 
Number 
Assignee/ 
Applicant Name 
 
Earliest Case Title 
 
Plaintiff 
Entity 
Class 
5132992 Paul Yurt & 
Browne H. Lee 
Acacia Media Tech. Co. v.  
New Destiny Internet 
Acacia Media 
Tech. Co. 
1 
6144702 Greenwich Informa-
tion Techs., LLC 
Acacia Media Tech. Co. v.  
New Destiny Internet 
Acacia Media 
Tech. Co. 
1 
5734961 Genese Antor Media Corp. v.  
Audiogalaxy, Inc. 
Antor Media 
Corp. 
10 
4924257 Jain Kanti Anvik Corp. v. Nikon Precision, Inc. Anvik Corp. 8 
5285236 Jain Kanti Anvik Corp. v. Nikon Precision, Inc. Anvik Corp. 8 
5291240 Anvik Corp. Anvik Corp. v. Nikon Precision, Inc. Anvik Corp. 8 
5721606 Jain Kanti Anvik Corp. v. Nikon Precision, Inc. Anvik Corp. 8 
5897986 Anvik Corp. Anvik Corp. v. Nikon Precision, Inc. Anvik Corp. 8 
6748318 Arrival Star, Inc. Arrival Star, Inc. v. Nistevo Corp. Arrival Star, Inc. 1 
6904359 Arrival Star, Inc. Arrival Star, Inc. v.  
Pilot Air Freight Corp. 
Arrival Star, Inc. 1 
5738872 Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc. 
Aventis Pharm. v. Barr Labs. Aventis Pharm. 8 
5855912 Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc. 
Aventis Pharm. v. Barr Labs. Aventis Pharm. 8 
6037353 Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc. 
Aventis Pharm. v. Barr Labs. Aventis Pharm. 8 
6113942 Aventis Pharm., Inc. Aventis Pharm. v. Barr Labs. Aventis Pharm. 8 
6187791 Merrell Pharm., Inc. Aventis Pharm. v. Barr Labs. Aventis Pharm. 8 
6399632 Merrell Pharm., Inc. Aventis Pharm. v. Barr Labs. Aventis Pharm. 8 
6482516 Banner 
Pharmacaps, Inc. 
Banner Pharmacaps, Inc. v. 
Perrigo Co. 
Banner  
Pharmacaps, Inc. 
8 
6044362 Alan R. Neely BCE Emergis Tech. v. EDOCS, Inc. BCE Emergis 
Tech. 
8 
6374229 Billingnetwork.com, 
Inc. 
Billingnetwork.com v.  
Advanced Healthcare 
Billingnet-
work.com 
8 
5951643 NCR Corp. Boardman Molded Prods., Inc. v. 
Mats, Inc. 
Boardman 
Molded Prods., 
Inc. 
8 
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Patent 
Number 
Assignee/ 
Applicant Name 
 
Earliest Case Title 
 
Plaintiff 
Entity 
Class 
6151601 NCR Corp. Boardman Molded Prods., Inc. v. 
Mats, Inc. 
Boardman 
Molded Prods., 
Inc. 
8 
6169997 NCR Corp. Boardman Molded Prods., Inc. v. 
Mats, Inc. 
Boardman 
Molded Prods., 
Inc. 
8 
6480855 NCR Corp. Boardman Molded Prods., Inc. v. 
Mats, Inc. 
Boardman 
Molded Prods., 
Inc. 
8 
6502096 NCR Corp. Boardman Molded Prods., Inc. v. 
Mats, Inc. 
Boardman 
Molded Prods., 
Inc. 
8 
5933630 Acceleration 
Software Int’l Corp. 
Computer Acceleration Corp. v.  
Microsoft Corp. 
Computer Acce-
leration Corp. 
1 
5883964 Cygnus Telecomms. 
Tech., LLC 
Cygnus Telecomms. Tech. v. Int’l Telec 
Ltd. 
Cygnus  
Telecomms. 
Tech. 
1 
6035027 Cygnus Telecomms. 
Tech.,  LLC 
Cygnus Telecomms. Tech. v. Int’l Telec 
Ltd. 
Cygnus  
Telecomms. 
Tech. 
1 
5910988 CSP Holdings, Inc. Datatreasury Corp. v. First Data Corp. Datatreasury 
Corp. 
1 
6032137 CSP Holdings, LLC Datatreasury Corp. v. First Data Corp. Datatreasury 
Corp. 
1 
4975950 Stephen A. Lentz Digital Dev. Corp. v.  
Asus Computer Int’l 
Digital Dev. 
Corp. 
10 
5121345 Stephen A. Lentz Digital Dev. Corp. v.  
Asus Computer Int’l 
Digital Dev. 
Corp. 
10 
6295530 Jonathan M. 
Bradshaw 
East Mfg. Corp. v. Titan Trailers, Inc. East Mfg. Corp. 8 
6961737 Ablaise Ltd. East Mfg. Corp. v. Titan Trailers, Inc. East Mfg. Corp. 8 
7075673 EON-Net, LP Eon-Net, LP v. Flagstar Bancorp Eon-Net, LP 5 
6683697 Millenium, LP Eon-Net, LP v. Black Hound New York Eon-Net, LP 5 
5313229 Federico G. 
Gilligan & 
Fernando D. Falcon 
F & G Research, Inc. v. Kye Int’l F & G Research, 
Inc. 
5 
4787722 Fresnel Techs., Inc. Fresnel Techs. v. Rokonet Indus. Fresnel Techs. 8 
RE35534 Fresnel Techs., Inc. Fresnel Techs. v. Rokonet Indus. Fresnel Techs. 8 
6294196 Hoffmann-La 
Roche, Inc. 
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v.  
Gate Pharm. 
Hoffman-La 
Roche, Inc. 
8 
6298862 Laughlin Prods., 
Inc. 
In re Laughlin Prods., Inc.,  
Patent Litig. 
Laughlin Prods., 
Inc. 
5 
6464703 Elektromedizin 
GmbH 
In re Katz Interactive Call  
Processing Patent Litig. 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
4663318 Bonnie Davis In re '318 Patent Infringement Litig. Barr Labs. 8 
5922333 Laughlin Prods., 
Inc. 
Laughlin Prods., Inc. v. TRB Group Laughlin Prods., 
Inc. 
5 
7040022 Great Neck Saw 
Mfrs., Inc. 
Laughlin Prods., Inc. v. Binder Laughlin Prods., 
Inc. 
5 
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5425085 Rates Tech. Inc. Laughlin Prods., Inc. v. Bariana Laughlin Prods., 
Inc. 
5 
6474343 Laughlin Prods., 
Inc. 
Laughlin Prods., Inc. v. ETS, Inc. Laughlin Prods., 
Inc. 
5 
5258855 System X, LP Millennium, LP v. 
Hyland Software, Inc. 
Millennium, LP 5 
5369508 System X, LP Millennium, LP v. 
Hyland Software, Inc. 
Millennium, LP 5 
5625465 Int’l Patent 
Holdings Ltd. 
Millennium, LP v. 
Hyland Software, Inc. 
Millennium, LP 5 
5768416 Millennium, LP Millennium, LP v. 
Hyland Software, Inc. 
Millennium, LP 5 
6094505 Millennium, LP Millennium, LP v. 
Hyland Software, Inc. 
Millennium, LP 5 
RE39247 Monsanto Tech., 
LLC 
Monsanto Co. v. SUGGS Monsanto Co. 8 
5352605 Monsanto Co. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling Monsanto Co. 8 
5699526 NCR Corp. NCR Corp. v. Microstrategy Inc. NCR Corp. 8 
6026403 NCR Corp. NCR Corp. v. Microstrategy Inc. NCR Corp. 8 
5137342 Oakley, Inc. Oakley, Inc. v. Pacific Sunwear Oakley, Inc. 8 
5367627 Clear with 
Computers, Inc. 
Orion IP, LLC v. Staples, Inc. Orion IP, LLC 1 
5615342 Clear with 
Computers, Inc. 
Orion IP, LLC v. Staples, Inc. Orion IP, LLC 1 
5053407 Daiichi Pharm. Co., 
Ltd. 
Ortho-McNeil Pharm. v. Mylan Labs. Ortho-McNeil 
Pharm. 
8 
5991791 NCR Corp. Overstock.com v. NCR Overstock.com 8 
6253203 NCR Corp. Overstock.com v. NCR Overstock.com 8 
6777095 Parker-Hannifin 
Corp. 
Parker-Hannifin Corp. v.  
Zippertubing (Japan) Ltd. 
Parker-Hannifin 
Corp. 
8 
5809336 Patriot Scientific 
Corp. 
Patriot Scientific Corp. v.  
Sony Corp. of Am. 
Patriot Scientific 
Corp. 
8 
6298341 RareDomains.com, 
LLC 
RareDomains.com, LLC v. Verio, Inc. RareDo-
mains.com, LLC 
8 
5519769 Rates Tech., Inc. Rates Tech., Inc. v. Tech. Arts, Inc. Rates Tech., Inc. 1 
5243627 AT&T Bell Labs. Rembrandt Techs., LP v.  
Comcast Corp. 
Rembrandt 
Techs., LP 
1 
6570967 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Alltel Corp. 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5109404 First Data Res., Inc. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Ahold USA Inc. 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
4792968 FDR Interactive 
Techs. 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
4930150 First Data Res., Inc. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
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5251252 First Data Res., Inc. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5255309 First Data Res., Inc. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5259023 First Data Res., Inc. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5351285 First Data Res., Inc. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5561707 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing,  LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5684863 Ronald A. Katz, 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5787156 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5828734 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5835576 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5898762 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5917893 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5974120 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
6035021 Ronald A. Katz  
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
6044135 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
6148065 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
6292547 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
6335965 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
6424703 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
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6434223 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
6512415 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
6678360 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP v. 
Citibank 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP 
5 
5048075 First Data Res., Inc. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, LP, 
v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 
Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, 
LP, 
5 
5338874 Tanaka Kikinzoku 
Kogyo K.K. 
Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC v. Sandoz, 
Inc. 
Sanofi-Aventis 
U.S., LLC 
8 
6495721 Teva Pharm.  
Indus., Ltd. 
Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v.  
Torrent Pharm. Ltd. 
Teva Pharm. 
Indus. Ltd. 
8 
6500987 Teva Pharm. 
 Indus. Ltd. 
Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v.  
Torrent Pharm. Ltd. 
Teva Pharm. 
Indus. Ltd. 
8 
6600073 Teva Pharm. 
Indus. Ltd. 
Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v.  
Torrent Pharm. Ltd. 
Teva Pharm. 
Indus. Ltd. 
8 
6897340 Teva Pharm. 
Indus. Ltd. 
Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v.  
Torrent Pharm. Ltd. 
Teva Pharm. 
Indus. Ltd. 
8 
4777354 Barry Thomas Thomas v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. Barry Thomas 9 
RE35616 Tillotson Corp. Tillotson Corp. v. High Five Prods. Tillotson Corp. 8 
6766304 Trading Techs. 
Int’l, Inc. 
Trading Tech. Int’l v. eSpeed, Inc. Trading Tech. 
Int’l 
8 
6772132 Trading Techs. 
Int’l, Inc. 
Trading Tech. Int’l v. eSpeed, Inc. Trading Tech. 
Int’l 
8 
5091171 Ruey J. Yu & Eugene 
J. Van Scott 
Tristrata Tech. v. Mary Kay, Inc. Tristrata Tech. 8 
5128984 First Data Res., Inc. Verizon CA, Inc. v.  
Ronald A. Katz Tech. 
Verizon CA, Inc. 5 
5815551 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Verizon CA, Inc. v.  
Ronald A. Katz Tech. 
Verizon CA, Inc. 5 
6349134 Ronald A. Katz 
Tech. Licensing, LP 
Verizon CA, Inc. v.  
Ronald A. Katz Tech. 
Verizon CA, Inc. 5 
6054482 Godecke 
Aktiengesellschaft 
Warner-Lambert Co. v.  
Purepac Pharm. 
Warner-Lambert 
Co. 
8 
